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REVIEW ESSAY
Taking the Islamist Movement Seriously: Social
Movement Theory and the Islamist Movement
R O E L
Few subjects have attracted as much attention as the Islamist movement but
have been so little understood. Is it a reactionary movement in revolt
against "modernity", because it "is desperate to hold out and turn back the
hands of time", as Brigadier-General Mark Kimmitt, spokesman for the
American troops in Iraq, recently remarked on the resistance in Falluja?'
Or is it a movement that takes the sources of the Islam literally, as
Orientalists believe? Or is it, as some sociologists argue, the result of
relative deprivation? Common to these explanations is their stress on crisis
and the irrational character of the movement. Although there have been
several brilliant insights into the dynamics of the Islamist movement during
past years/ and there are several precursors of social movement theory
(SMT),5 as well as many studies that have borrowed from SMT,4 four new
studies make a coordinated attempt to open the way for a more systematic
way of applying SMT to the Islamist movement.* Based on the long
r. The Guardtan, i April 1004. See also Roei Meijer, '"Defending our Honour': Authenticity
and the Framing of Resistance in the Iraqi Town of FallujaB, Etnofoor, (forthcoming)
2. Gilles Kepel, jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London, 2002), and Olivier Roy, L'islam
mondialisé (Paris, 2002).
3. See for înstance> the insightful and stimulating work by Shaul Mishal and Avrabam Sela, The
Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence, und Coexistence (New York, 2000), and Asef Bayat, Street
Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran (New York, 1997). The contribution to Quintan
Wiktorowicz (ed.), Islamic Activism; A Social Movement Theory Approach {Bloomingîon, ïN,
2004), by Glenn E. Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement", pp, 112-139, has the same
approach.
4. For instance, this is the case for Minem Vierges, "Genesis of Mobilization: The Young
Activists of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front", in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork (cds), Political Islam:
Essays from Middle East Report (Berkeley, CA, 1597), pp. 29^-305; and Beverley Milton-
Edwards., Islamic Politics in Palestine (London [ere.], 1996), and, more recently, Judith Palmer
Hank, Hezbollah: The Changing Fa.cc of Terrorism (Londont 2004).
j. T will review the anthology Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, which
includes several contributions of the most prominent researchers on the subject. The other three
studies are: Carry Rosefsky Wickham, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism, and Political
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tradition of SMT in the United States and Europe, founded by, among
others, Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam, and Sidney Tarrow, and brought to
Europe by Hans-Peter Kriesi and Bert Klandermans, these studies have
taken up the challenge of applying the enriching insights of SMT to a non-
Western context and to one of the most important contemporary social
movements.6 The question is, how successful are they? In answering this
question, I will first give an outline of their programme, review their more
extensive studies, and than compare them with other studies on the subject.
M A N I F E S T O
The anthology, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach,
should be read as a manifesto. The editor of the study, Quintan
Wiktorowicz, presents the SMT programme as "a unifying framework
and agenda that can provide effective modes of inquiry to further
boundaries of research on Islamic activism" (p. 4). He states that most
studies on the Islamist movement have been inadequate because they were
based on psychological causes of mass mobilization and concentrated on
"structural strains" that produce "social anomie", "despair", and "anxi-
ety". These "illnesses" were deemed to be the result of rapid socio-
economic transformations, rural-urban migration, and the subsequent
clash between the traditional values of the village and the anonymity of the
modern city. Another version of strain theory ascribes the rise of the
Islamist movement to the growing influence of an aggressive Western
culture in the Middle East, while a third source of alienation and social
frustration is attributed to lack of democracy.
The curt answer to these theories, following Doug McAdam, is that
grievances are ubiquitous but social movements are not. To be sure, most
of the upholders of social movement theory recognize that psychologicai
and political strains and frustration play a role in the rise of the Islamist
movement. But they argue that these factors in themselves are unable to
explain the emergence and dynamics of the Islamist movement. These are
based on factors such as the successful mobilization and organization of a
following. To underscore their point, Wiktorowicz and others point out
that most members of Islamist social movements are not "dysfunctional"
individuals who are "seeking psychological comfort". In fact, in most cases
Change in Egypt (New York, 2002); Quintan Wiktorowicz, The Management of Islamic
Activism: Salafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Poorer in Jordan (Albany, NY, 2001); and
Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World
(Boulder, CO [etc.], 2003).
6. For an overview of the results of four decades of social movement theory sec, Sidney Tarrow.
Power in Movement (2nd edn, Cambridge, 1998), and Doug McAdamt Sidney Târrow, and
Charles Tiily, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge, 2001).
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they are well-educated, highly motivated individuals who act in their own
interests (p. 9).
It is in the analysis of the dynamics of the movement that SMT provides
its most promising prospects. The major advantage of SMT is that it is one
of the few theoretical constructs that takes the Islamist movement
seriously. Influenced by rational choice theory - although not everyone
is happy with it, on account of its focus on the individual instead of the
group/ and self-interest instead of persuasion8 - SMT emphasizes the
rational character of the Islamist movement. One of its major tasks is to
demonstrate that the Islamist movement takes strategic decisions and
adapts its programme and ideology to changing circumstances.
Advocates of SMT argue that it does this in three ways. Firstly, basing
their argument on resource mobilization theory (RMT), the contributors
to the anthology argue that the Islamist movement, like all other social
movements, organizes the mobilization of resources through communica-
tion channels, the division of labour, and the financing of the movement. It
initiates these activities with the goal of "maximizing] its impact and
efficaciousness" (p. 10). Three fields of resource mobilization structure are
in theory available to the Islamist movement: (i) the formal political
mobilizing structure of political parties and legal institutions; (2) the legal
environment of civil society in the form of NGOs, medical clinics, charity
societies, schools, and especially professional organizations; and (3) the
informal sector of social networks and personal ties.
Which of these fields of resource mobilization are mobilized depends to
a great extent on their ability to take advantage of the existing opportunity
structures and their overcoming of constraints, the second concept the
authors have adopted from SMT. Like RMT, this concept emphasizes the
logical and rational character of the movement by contextualizing it and
regarding it as an active agent that makes strategic choices based on the
opportunities it encounters and creates and the constraints it comes up
against and overcomes. As Wiktorowicz argues, the Islamist movement
does not operate in a vacuum, but belongs to "a broader social milieu and
context characterized by shifting and fluid configurations of enablements
and constraints that structure movements dynamics" (p. 13). Its success
depends on the "political space" it creates, which in turn depends on its
level of access to political institutions and decision-making, the degree of
receptivity of the established elite to challenger groups, the capacity of the
movement to find allies, and the level of state repression.
From the collected evidence, "access" appears to be much more difficult
in the Middle East than the West, on which the model of social movement
theory is based. The crucial difference from Western social movements,
7. Robinson. "Hamas as Social Movement", pp. 114-115.
8. Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, p. 206.
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which the manifesto stresses, is that Islamist movements are not only
confronted by repressive authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states, they
are usually also opposed by a unified and closed elite that does not allow
movements to organize themselves as political parties or be overtly active
in civil society. For this reason, Islamist movements in general mostly
operate on the periphery and semi-periphery of society, finding first of all
refuge in the informal sector, to a lesser extent in civil society, and rarely in
the "centre" - parliamentary politics.
Framing is the third theoretical notion derived from SMT that figures
prominently in the manifesto. This is not surprising, as the Islamist
movement is considered a "new social movement", that primarily focuses
on creating meaning and identity. Following Robert Benford and David
Snow,' frames are defined as "schemata that offer a language and cognitive
tools for making sense of experiences and events in the world 'out there'"
(p. 15). Frames diagnose a condition, provide solutions to problems, and
motivate and support collective action. They are successful when they
achieve "frame resonance", i.e. find sufficient response that will transform
mobilization potential into actual mobilization. Thus, in accordance with
their constructivist approach, social movement theorists argue that ideas
and frames are not rigid God-given principles, even if they are based on
sacred scripture. Rather, they are flexible and adaptable to changing
political and socioeconomic circumstances. How they are formed,
adjusted and achieve "frame resonance", Wiktorowicz argues, does not
only depend on their relation with indigenous cultural symbols, language,
and identities but also on the reputation of the individual or group
responsible for articulating the frame. The authority of the spokesperson
uttering the words is as important as the content. Ideology must therefore
always be balanced by factors such as the political and cultural
environment and resource mobilization and leadership.
A P P L I C A T I O N
The authors of the four studies have worked with these theoretical
constructs in different ways and applied them to different subjects. Carry
Rosefsky Wickham has focused on the peaceful "Islamic outreach" to the
educated lower middle classes in Egypt. She is also one of the most careful
researchers in trying to find a balance between the three elements of SMT:
resource mobilization theory, opportunities and constraints, and frames.
In general, she is successful in avoiding the traps of subsuming one to the
other and reductionism.
Her main contention concerning the political environment in Egypt is
9. Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An
Overview and Assessment", Annual Review of Sociology, 26 (2000), pp. 611-639.
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that the reform of the authoritarian state during the regimes of Presidents
Sadat (1970-1981) and Mubarak (ipSi-now) failed in the attempt to
establish new ways of relating to its citizens. Whereas "restricted
pluralism", the blocking of political access, alienated the lower middle
classes politically, the incapacity of the regime to create jobs led to
economic deprivation. Alienation was therefore, as Rosefsky Wickham
argues, not the result of a reaction to "'modernity' wnt large", as strain
analysts would have it, but the result of specific political developments and
situations (p. 75). The major achievement of the Islamist movement was to
turn these disadvantages of "opportunities and constraints" to its favour.
Rosefsky Wickham describes how economic liberalization, the inflow
of Gulf money, and Mubarak's partial political accommodation of the
non-violent Islamist movement during the first half of the 19805, allowed it
to create enough political and social space to find new niches in which it
could mobilize its following. Due to its flexibility and decentralized nature
(p. 105), the state could do little but acquiesce in the establishment of an
independent "Islamic parallel sector" in the form of Islamic banking and
establishment of schools, social services, and personal networks centred on
the mosques. Meanwhile, its leaders and members settled in the new
neighbourhoods on the fringes of Cairo. It was precisely the lack of well-
established institutions of communal self-help that allowed the Islamists to
put down roots in these neighbourhoods. Once established on the margins
of society, the movement was able to mobilize its following to capture the
"semi-periphery", i.e. civil society, by winning the elections of the
professional associations at the beginning of the 19905. At this point the
state stepped in. Afraid that the next step would be that it lost control of
the "centre", the state clamped down on the Muslim Brotherhood and
arrested its "middle generation" during the elections of 1995.
Rosefsky Wickham's analysis of the mobilization of the Islamist
movement on the periphery and its assault from there on the semi-
periphery constitutes the crux of her research and is its most fascinating
and challenging part. It is here that SMT makes a difference and provides
new instruments to tackle the question of why and how the Islamist
movement emerged and has been so successful. Her answer is that success
was predicted on the achievement of the leadership in finding "frame
resonance". Criticizing deprivation theorists, she argues that "Islamist
mobihzers in Egypt did not simply exploit the frustrations of unemployed
and underemployed youth. The key to understanding their success is to
realize that they engaged in a massive ideological project to capture the
hearts and minds of potential recruits" (p. 120). She argues convincingly
that a new ethic of "civic obligation", promoting participation in the public
sphere, regardless of its benefits and costs, was at the heart of Islamist
success in mobilizing its following. In accordance with the constructivist
nature of framing, she argues that the established cultural traditions and
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Islamic doctrines were adapted to new purposes by shifting the outreach to
ordinary Muslims (instead of non-Muslims) and giving them a new activist
interpretation of proper Muslim conduct.
A central element in the new doctrine was the remterpretation of the
practice of the da'wa, "call", or outreach, as a fard 'ayn, a duty incumbent
on every Muslim to participate in the Islamic reform of society. "Indeed,"
she argues,
[...] with its emphasis on collective adherence to a God-given moral code and
collective responsibility for the public welfare, the da'wa projected a vision of
Islamic rule that stood out as a striking reverse image of the status quo. Against
the perceived reality of state elites preoccupied with self-enrichment and
removed from popular needs and concerns, the da 'iva conveyed the image of a
leadership animated by its religious duty to safeguard the well-being of the
Islamic umma. (p. 160)
Elaborating on the method of da'iea, Rosefsky Wickham states that
Islamic outreach was a peaceful and personal, gradualist means of
establishing an Islamic society. Da'wa fardiyya (personal da'wa), she
argues, was first propagated among relatives, neighbours, and peers before
it was directed to strangers through general da'wa. (da'iL-a 'ammo), which
was accomplished through lectures, lessons, and the media: books,
newspapers, and tapes. Rosefsky Wickham is, however, careful not to
ascribe the success of the movement to ideology as such. It hinged, she
states, on conditions external to the message itself.
Pulling all the strings of her analysis together at the end of her study, she
states that success depended on: (i) its close "fit" with the life experiences
and beliefs of those graduates targeted for recruitment; (2) the credibility
and effectiveness of its agents and modes of transmission; and (3) its
reinforcement through intensive small-group solidarity. "Frame reso-
nance" is therefore predicted on the special linkages which leaders forged
and sustained with potential recruits. It was their incorporation into
personal networks and the gradual evolution of individual members from
lower-risk forms of activism to higher-risk forms that accounted for the
movement's success. The frame of moral obligation supported this trend.
She argues convincingly that the "crisis of morals" perceived to be at the
root of the country's malaise was also at the basis of the moral regeneration
programme of the Islamist frame (p. 159).
Qumton Wiktorowicz's monograph, The Management of Islamic
Activism: Saiafis, the Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan
further elaborates on the specific opportunity structure in Jordan.
Interestingly, in contrast to the enthusiastic and optimistic researchers of
the civil-society school who greeted the liberal reforms in Jordan in the
early 19905 with enthusiasm, Wiktorowicz is much more pessimistic, and
argues that the "democratization from above" has further enhanced state
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control of social movement organizations (SMOs). Rather than enhancing
the participation of Jordanians in politics it has led to widespread
dépoli ticization.
In order to achieve this goal, the state has developed a "series of
bureaucratic techniques to observe, register, record, and monitor all forms
of collective action in the kingdom", leading to a bureaucratic "management
of collective action" that "channels movements m particular directions by
setting boundaries for permissible actions" (p. 13). Accordingly, all Islamic
forms of space in Jordan are controlled and regulated, including mosques,
NGOs, and Friday sermons (khutba's), with the purpose of preventing
them from criticizing the government and mobilizing an opposition. To
implement this policy, which Wiktorowicz compares to Foucaultian
"surveillance", imams are government trained, appointed, and monitored;
Zakat committees are considered a "cover for government control"; while
Ramadan is "ritualized and personalized" (p. 20). As it is possible to exercise
control to a far greater degree in a relatively small country such as Jordan
than in Egypt, not only is access to the parliamentary "centre", as a forum
for the social movement to develop, blocked to a greater degree but the
restrictions on civil society are also far greater.
Although the Moslem Brotherhood is usually regarded as the main
oppositional power, the Salafi movement is, according to Wiktorowicz,
the real embodiment of the Jordanian social movement. Based on its
oppositional literalist Islamic programme that rejects the legitimacy of the
state because it accepts innovation (bid'a), it is the only movement that
refuses to be trapped in the government system of regulation and
surveillance. As one Salafi scholar stated it: "Organized work is frightening
because it often means you give up some principles" (p. 132). Instead of
betraying its programme by accepting the government's control, the Salafi
movement mobilizes its following through informal "personal, face-to-
face interactions where they communicate, recruit, educate, and facilitate
the movement's goals of transforming society through religious educa-
tion" (p. 133). Banned from official mosques, Salafis gather in houses,
while decentralization and lack of a single leadership in the movement
makes it more difficult for the government to control it.
Mohammed Hafez's book on rebellious Muslims, Why Muslims Rebel:
Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World complements the other
three studies by focusing on the violent movement and its mechanisms.
Hafez's motivation for writing the book is the complaint that "what is
missing is a sustained theoretical treatment of Islamist rebellion and an
attempt at explanation of it, in a comparative perspective" (p. 3). He uses a
political-process approach and argues that researchers should not ask why
a movement rises up in revolt, but that they should pose the more
appropriate question "hoK ts the process?" by which a movement becomes
rebellious (p. 21). In accordance with general SMT, he holds that it is the
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researchers' task to focus on the ways that "individuals will have to
mobilize resources, recruit committed activists, and establish organiza-
tional structures that can withstand repression" (p. 17), all of which are
ignored by socioeconormc and psychological "strain-theory" approaches.
Hafez's main — and perhaps most controversial - contention is that
political exclusionary states are solely responsible for the bloodshed that
has taken place in the Islamic world during the past decades: "The key to
explaining their militancy [of the members of the Islamist movement] is
not economic stagnation or excessive secularization, but the lack of
meaningful access to state institutions" (p. 18) . It is state repression that is
at the root of Islamist rebellions. This approach is reflected in the
organization of the book.
In the first chapter the author analyses the political environment of
political exclusion and lack of system accessibility that has led to the
emergence of rebellious Islamist movements. In the next chapter, he
analyses the results of repression, arguing that "[IJslamist rebellions are
often defensive reactions to overly repressive regimes that misapply their
repression in ways that radicalize, rather than deter movement activists
and supporters" (p. 71). Here, he convincingly argues that timing and
targeting of repression by the state are crucial elements that determine if a
movement will rise up in revolt. Whereas, on the one hand, pre-emptive
repression, according to Hafez, is effective because it does not allow a
movement to organize itself, mobilize its resources, and acquire a coherent
frame, on the other hand, reactive repression provokes movements to
revolt because their members have been allowed to organize themselves,
and have in the meantime built an infrastructure that they are not willing to
lose. Another crucial determinant is the nature of repression. Selective
repression, which distinguishes between moderate and radicals, is much
more effective than indiscriminate repression. The last form of repression
leaves no other option but to revolt, and will alienate broad sections of the
population which are loosely associated with the movement.
In the two examples he has studied in depth, Algeria and Egypt, reactive
repression in combination with indiscriminate repression has led to the
emergence of the most violent forms of organizations that are exclusive,
uniform, and isolated, and which uphold the most extreme ideologies that
support "protracted" struggles. The ensuing vicious circle of violence
tends to deepen the social and ideological isolation of the group further,
leading to what Donatella Delia Porta, a specialist in the history of the Red
Brigades in Italy in the 19705, calls "spirals of encapsulation" (p. i l l ) .
During this process, group members lose touch with reality as "[g]roup
pressures are especially magnified for the underground group, so that the
group is the only source of confirmation, and, in the face of external danger
and pursuit, the only source of reality" (p. 112).
As the "anti-system ideological frames" of rebellious movements permit
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"moral disengagement", they lead to denial of the neutrality of citizens. As
a result, all confrontations are regarded as part of a cosmic struggle in
which reform and reconciliation is ruled out and there is no option but to
wage an all-out war against the rulers and the corrupt system. In the
Islamist case, the anti-system frame adopts the form of accusing the other
of being infidel (takfir), which is expressed in slogans as those of G1A: "No
dialogue, no ceasefire, no reconciliation, and no security and guarantee
with the apostate regime" (p. 169). Hafez's contribution on Algeria to the
anthology Islamic Actimsm: A Social Movement Approach, and the
contribution with Wiktorowicz on Egyptian Islamist violence further
elaborates on these issues.10
C O N T R I B U T I O N
The introduction of social movement theory to the Middle East, and its
application to the Islamist movement, undoubtedly represents a positive
development in that it represents one of the most consistent attempts to
devise a more neutral, objective set of theoretical tools to analyse the
movement as a dynamic movement without focusing on Islam as the
determinant factor. It thus avoids the pitfalls of stereotyping and
essentializing that so often mars research on the Islamist movement."
These advantages are especially underlined if SMT is compared with
civil society theories, the predominant theoretical construct let loose on
the Middle East in the 19805. By providing a programme of systematic
comparative analysis with other social movements in the world it avoids
the sterile, ahistorical debate on civil society and the implied potential for
democracy in the region.12 Not only have researchers who apply civil
society theory ignored the largest and most important existent social
movement, because it was, according to them, not sufficiently committed
to "democracy", and did not uphold the basic tenets of "civility", but they
also neglected it because the informal sector in which it was primarily
active was regarded as irrelevant. The informal sector was assumed not to
be able to contribute to the enhancement of the formal structure of civil
io. Mohammed M. Hafea, "From Marginalisation to Massacres: A Political Process Explana-
tion of GIA Violence in Algeria", in Wiktorowic«, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory
Approach, pp. 37-60, and idem, with Quintan Wiktorowicz, "Violence as Contention m the
Egyptian Islamic Movement", in ibid., pp. 61-88.
i t . Sec also the insightful contribution made by Charles Kurzman in the "Conclusion" to
Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory- Approach, on the late adoption of
social movement theory by researchers working on the Islamist movement.
12. See for the most extensive collection of articles on the concept of civil society, Augustus
Richard Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East* vol. I (Leiden, I99s)> with contnhutions
by Augustus Richard Norton "Introduction", pp. i -26; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Civil Society and
Prospects for Democratization in the Arab World", pp. 27-54; and Mustapha Kami] al-Sayyidr
"A Civil Society in Egypt?", pp. 269-293.
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society and the struggle against the authoritarian state. The basic flaw of
civil society theory was that it never seemed to solve the paradox that a real
civil society must both be independent of the state while at the same time
needing the state to provide the legal environment in which its institutions
can flourish.'3 In hindsight, it appears that civil society theory was based
on a far too optimistic assumption. Researchers' focus on the concept of
civil society was as much based on the hope that state power would be
curbed and controlled by civil society in the 19805 than by the actual
emergence and power of this mediating layer of independent institutions.
SMT does not rule out the emergence of democracy in the Middle East,
but it focuses on the organizational mechanisms of how Islamist move-
ments react to authoritarian regimes. Whether the movement is democratic
or not is intrinsically irrelevant. In this sense SMT, although a research
programme that also derives from the West, is far !ess morally committed
to a certain political model, and is politically unbiased and therefore more
open and flexible than civil society theories, which are imbued with
Western liberal political values and goals. By looking again at social and
personal networks, as other contributors have done in the SMT, such as
Diane Singerman,14 Janine Clark,'' Benjamin Smith,16 and Julian
Schwedler,17 the anthology Islamic Activism: A Social Movement
Approach has refocused attention on crucial social relations. Its stress on
the informal nature of the social movements makes an important
contribution to international research on social movements, as the research
on Western social movements is usually more focused on formal social
movement organizations (SMOs).
By taking the Islamist movement seriously and considering it a rational
movement, SMT also moves away from the facile conclusions that
(mostly) French researchers have drawn. Against their mantra that the
Islamist movement has "failed" to achieve its goals because it does not have
a political programme,'8 Rosefsly Wickham and others, like Salwa
13. Michael Walzer, "The Concept of Civil Society", in idem (éd.) Toward a Global Civil
Society (Providence, RÏ [etc.], 1995), pp. 7-27.
14. See for instance Diane Singerrnan, "The Networked World of Islamist Social Movements",
m Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, pp. 143—163, andrem,
Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics, and Networks in Urban Quarters of Cairo (cv
Princeton, Nj, 1995).
15. Janine A. Clark, "Islamist Women in Yemen: Informal Nodes of Activism", in Wiktorowicz,
Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, pp. 164-784.
16. Benjamin Smith, "Action with and without Islam: Mobilizing the Bazaar in Iran", in
Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach, pp. 18^-204.
17. JilJian Schwedler, "The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building
in a Transitional Polit}-", in Wiktorowicz, Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory
Approach, pp. 205-228.
18. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (tr. Carol Volk) (Cambridge, MA, 1994); and
Repel,/ï'Aflc/. The Trail of Political Islam.
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Ismail,1' argue convincingly that the programme of "civic obligation" that
the Islamist movement upholds is in fact a hidden political agenda. That it
is not overt is not simply due to a lack of political content in the ideology
of the movement, but must be ascribed to the repressive political climate in
which the movement operates. The spread of the notion of "collective
responsibility for public welfare" is a rational response in a depoluicized
repressive environment. Only after gaining political access can more direct
political issues be addressed.
C R I T I Q U E
However, besides distinct advantages, SMT also evokes critique.
Although, in general, SMT does give its three constituent factors enough
room, and especially allows enough space to analyse ideas through the
concept of framing, it can lead to a form of functionalism by looking at
ideas only insofar they have a bearing on the social movement. In this
manner, all those ideas and ideological constructs that do not directly
impinge on the movement or are not immediately reflected in its frames are
deemed irrelevant. One will therefore look in vain for a genealogy of the
concept of jihad, because it is regarded as a constructivist concept that is
contextually formed and bounded. This leads to strange results. For
instance, in the work of Hafez, anti-system ideas like takfir are extensively
analysed, but in the end they are deemed irrelevant to explanations of the
rebellions of Islamist movements, for although they might have anti-
system content this is not the reason for Islamist uprisings. Rather, it is the
repression of the state that activates these anti-system frames. Although it
is certainly true that Middle Eastern states are authoritarian and repressive,
and Hafez gives an interesting explanation of the form and depth of recent
rebellions in especially Egypt and Algeria, one wonders if the Islamist
movement only acts upon its violent doctrines once it has been repressed.
This puts the blame too much on the political system and gives too little
credit to the independent influence of the violent content of the ideology.20
On another level, the critique by SMT of incorporating an analysis of
the social backgrounds of the members of social movements raises
questions. Here again the critique of the prevailing analyses of strain
theories as describing social movements as the result of an "illness" is
relevant, but one wonders if SMT has not gone too far. Shifting the
question from how Islamist movements organize themselves to why they
19. Salwa Ismail, "The Paradox of Islamist Policies", Middle East Report, 221 (Winter 2001),
PP- 34-39-
20. Excellent examples demonstrating the flexible and adaptability of idéologies and "frames"
are analysed in Robinson, "Hamas as Social Movement"; and Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian
Hamas: Vision, Violence, and Coexistence, as well as Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of
Terrorism.
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emerge is an interesting change in perspective. It, however, still leaves the
question of why they rebelled and especially -who they are, unanswered.
Clearly if one has less to lose, one is more inclined towards rebellion,
although, as the social movement theorists correctly state, this does not
answer the question of why economic deprivation does not lead to revolt
more often.
To be sure, this neglect of social background is not always strictly
adhered to, as is the case in Rosefsky Wickham's study, when she analyses
the plight of the lower middle classes. She does not, however, incorporate
in her analyses social tensions that might exist between different sections
of the moderate Islamist movement, as for instance between the "middle
generation" of Islamic activists, who have become successful and wealthy
doctors and engineers belonging to the upper middle classes, and the lower
middle classes whom they lead. Similarly, Wiktorowicz points out the
differences in social background between the moderate non-violent Salafis
and the violent jihadi Salafis, but he does not further elaborate on the
consequences (p. 127). His claim that "fTJhese more socially conscious
members are the potential recruits of the Salafi movement" (p. 136),
remains therefore unclear. In this respect, Gilles Kepel's work, though
perhaps too schematic, has a more convincing perspective because he
analyses the internal differences within the Islamist movement and puts the
blame for its failure to attain power there. It is not just the repressive
nature of the state, which in general is too schematically regarded as an
monolithic opponent by the upholders of SMT, that is at fault.21
Finally, there is also another important element lacking in SMT, which is
the neglect of such pervasive social phenomena in the Middle East as the
patronage system and its manifestations, patriarchy and clientalism.22 If
SMT correctly stresses the importance of informal personal networks, it
seems strange that in the Middle East, where patronage and its vertical
relations of dependency and patron-client relationship have been such
conspicuous aspects of society, they are largely ignored in the application
of SMT to Islamist movements. The two elements do not necessary
exclude each other, and when combined can explain many of the aspects of
social movements that now remain unclear. The emergence of exclusivist
and isolated organizations, for instance, that Hafez describes as the
outcome of repression, could very well be the result of the ubiquitous
patron—client relations that the oppositional groups have also adopted.
Why should the opposition not mirror the political culture in the rest of
society? Similarly, the vertical and segmented patronage system might also
explain Wiktorowicz's divisions within the Salafi movement. It is more
21. Kepe[,Jihad: The Trad of Political hiam.
22. For a recent overview, see Sann Zubaida, "Islam and the Politics of Community and
Citizenship", Middle East Report, 221 (winter 2001), pp. 20-27.
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likely that they are the result of patron-client relations than the inability
to establish formal organizations. As with so many other stimulating and
innovative theoretical constructs, social movement theory as applied to the
Islamist movement is at times unnecessarily radical in its rejection of its
precursors.
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THE 'CYCLE OF CONTENTION' AND
THE LIMITS OF TERRORISM IN
SAUDI ARABIA
Roei Meijer
This chapter analyses the events and the men involved in the bomb
attacks and shootouts that have taken place in Saudi Arabia since
May 2003. It concentrates on the political, organisational and bio-
graphical background of those held responsible for the attacks, mem-
bers of Al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP). Social movement
theory (SMT), especially the notion of cycle of contention, has been
used to analyse these events. First follows a brief overview of the
main concepts of this theory, then an outline of the cycle of con-
tention as it emerged in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s until the winter
of 2004.
Social Movements, Cycles of Contention and Violence
In Power in Movement: Social Movement and Contentious Politics, Sidney
Tarrow gives an outline of the results of research of contentious social
movements during the previous two decades. A social movement is
based on collective action and 'becomes contentious when it is used
by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name
of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that funda-
mentally challenge others or the authorities.'1 The central concepts
of'contentious action' would seem to be highly relevant to the Saudi
case. One key concept is that of'framing', because a movement must
1 Sidney Tanow, Pouvr in Movement: Sodul Movements and Contentious Politics, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1998, 2nd edn, p. 3.
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create meaning and an identity, denning 'us' and 'them', based on a
problem that it claims it can solve. Creating identities, furthermore,
is a precondition for consensus building and 'frame resonance'.2 Another
concept is that of'political opportunity structure', which is defined
as 'dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives
for people to undertake collective action [...]'. Political opportu-
nities, such as the fall of the communist regimes in 1989, allow social
movements and challengers to emerge and make their claims. To put
the authorities under pressure, challengers adopt a 'repertoire of
contention', which, depending on the political circumstances and
the cultural background, can take the form of petitions, strikes, mar-
ches, disruption, or violence.3 Depending on the opportunity struc-
ture, social movements can take advantage of the weakness of the
authorities, gain access to political and participation power, achieve
shifts in ruling alignments, and in extreme cases, split the ruling elite.
Cycles of contention occur when opportunities widen and infor-
mation spreads down and ordinary people 'begin to test the limits of
social control'. During such periods of diffusion, characterised by
heightened information flows and rapid mobilisation, the opportu-
nities created by 'early risers' provide incentives for the formation of
new alliances and the experimentation with new forms of conten-
tion.* As the cycle widens and becomes more powerful, movements
create opportunities for elites to join or support the movement. The
result of this phase of mobilisation, if it is successful, will be reform or
a revolution.
Two additional remarks should be made. The first is related to the
state, which in modern history has become the focus of contentious
politics.5 The state has three options in dealing with the contenders:
facilitation, accommodation, or repression. The outcome of the con-
flict depends on the strength of the state. If a ruling elite is split and
weak and the movement is strong, as was the case in Iran in 1979, the
outcome will be the destruction of the former. On the other hand, if
the state is strong, the ruling elite united, and the challengers divided
and weak, as was the case in the struggle between the Syrian state
and the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, the contentious movement
2 find, pp. 18-19.
3 ffi;d., p. 20.
'Aid.,p. 24.
5 Itel., pp. 58-63.
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will be destroyed. If the ruling elite is smart, it will opt for a com-
bined policy of repression, accommodation and facilitation.' In this
manner it will split the moderates from radicals and integrate the
moderates into the system, or hold them at bay, while at the same
rime repressing the radicals. For, 'movements not only create oppor-
tunities for themselves and their allies; they also create opportunities
for their opponents." For instance, this happened in Egypt in the
1990s when the state split the Islamist movement.8 It also spelled the
end of the phase of mobilisation and the beginning of the phase of
demobilisation.
The second remark is related to the issue of violence. Tarrow and
others, like Delia Porta and Diani," believe that the threat of violence
can be effective, but that actual violence raises the 'costs' to the par-
ticipants in collective action and eventually undermines the goals of
the social movement. Violence is often used when the movement is
either being repressed or has exhausted itself. In these situations,
'physical violence and exaggerated rhetoric are used to remvigorate
flagging militants, attract new supporters and retain the notice of the
state.'10 The result is mostly negative, unless the state has coUapsed, or
the struggle is an ethnic, religious or national conflict, as in the case
of the Sunni resistance in Iraq." Tarrow argues that '[violence] has a
polarising effect on conflict and alliance systems, transforming rela-
tions between challengers and authorities from a confused, many
sided game of allies, enemies, and bystanders into a bipolar one in
which people are forced to choose sides, allies defect, and the state's
repressive apparatus swings into gear.'12 Thus, in general, radical con-
tenders 'chill the blood of the bystanders, give pause to prospective
allies and cause many who joined the movement in its enthusiastic
early phase to defect.'13 When that happens 'organisers are trapped in
6fttJ.,pp. 147-50.
7IUJ. {1994edn),p. 97.
B Giles Kepel Jihad: The Trail ofPtiiitua Islam, London: I. B. Tauns. 2000, pp. 276-98.
9 Donatella Delia Porta and Mano Diani, Soàal Movements: An Introduction,
Oxfoid: Blackwell, 1999, pp. 188-90.
10 Tarrow, Tlie Power in Movement (1994), p. 112.
11 Roei Meijer,'"Defending our Honor1': Authenticity and the Framing of Resist-
ance in the Iraqi Sunm Town of Failuja', Etnofoor, 2005 {forthcoming},
12 Tarrow, The Power m Movement (1994),p. Î04.
"Ibid,?, in.
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a military confrontation with the authorities that is virtually impos-
sible for them to win.'14 As Hafez and others point out, the exclusive
organisations that emerge from this struggle lead to protracted vio-
lence, a development that took place in Algeria and Egypt in the
1990s.15
The Saudi Cycle of Contention
From non-violent to violent opposition
Many of the above-mentioned characteristics of social movements
and the cycle of contention apply to Saudi Arabia since the 1990s.
The first phase of mobilisation and diffusion of the cycle of con-
tention dates from the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Allowing
US troops to launch their attack on the Iraqi troops from Saudi
Arabia, caused significant difficulty for the Kingdom's rulers. This
decision in itself provided an important structure of opportunity for
the opposition to launch its contentious politics. Having been based
since its foundation on the coalition between the ruling House of
Sa'ud and the »lama, who upheld the conservative (Salafi) Wahhabi
doctrine of Islam, the monarchy was now arguably exposed as hypo-
critical as it was revealed to be highly dependent on the 'infidel'
United States. What made matters worse, was that the state had for
decades supported the most radical Jihadi Salafi groups as long as they
exported the jihad to countries Saudi Arabia attempted to control."
Initially, peaceful petition was the main repertoire of contention
adopted by the non-violent opposition. Saudi liberal businessmen
and intellectuals were the first to submit a petition calling for greater
14 Ibid.,p. 105. Aside from the many studies on the role of violence in social move-
ments, Tarrow and Delia Porta draw their conclusions from their own work on
the radicalisation of the Italian Left in the 5970s.
15 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Résistance in the Islatntf
World, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rjenner, 2003, pp. 109-13: Mohammed H. Hafez,
'From Marginahzation to Massacres: A Political Process Explanation of GIA
Violence in Algeria' in Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.J, Islamic Activism: A Social
Movement Theory Approach, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003.
pp. 37-60; and Mohammed H. Hafez and Quintan Wictorowicz, 'Violence as
Contention in the Egyptian Islamic Movement' m Wictorowicz, Islamic Activism,
pp. 61-88.
16 Kepei, The Trail of Political Mam, pp. 61-80.
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democratic openness in 1990,'7 but this form of contention of the
'early risers' was quickly defused, and petitions were drawn up by the
religious radical opposition that were far more important and threat-
ening. In May 1991 the 'Letter of Demands' (khitab al-matalib), signed
by 400 ulama, judges, university professors and other leading scho-
lars, was submitted to the King. It was followed a year later by a
cSarificaoon that was harsher in tone, the Memorandum of Advice
(mudhakkirat al-nasiho). In contrast to the liberal petition, these two
petitions demanded a more rigorous application of religious norms
(council for the conformity o(shari'a) and the building up of a strong
army that would guarantee Saudi Arabia's independence and its
championing of Muslim causes. They also accused the royal family
of nepotism, corruption and moral decadence.18 Formulated in a
master frame, the radical opposition stated their grievance in general
terms that citizens of the state should withdraw their allegiance from
rulers as long as they did not abide by the shari 'a. For the first time
the theme of takfir, the proclamation of unbelief of one's opponent,
was used as a means of de-legitimating the ruling family of Sa'ud.
The second theme, which was to become part and parcel of opposi-
tional rhetoric, was the condemnation of the United States as the
embodiment of evil, decadence, and the spearhead of the Western,
Christian 'war on Islam'."
Relations with the state entered the second phase of the cycle of
contention—that of demobilisation—when the state temporarily
arrested the signatories of the petitions.* Having recovered from the
initial shock of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the boldness of the
internal opposition, the ruling family announced that it would not
accept criticism outside the limited boundaries of 'consultation'
17 Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thcu: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition, Wash-
ington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, p. 31.
18 Daryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia ana the Momentum of
Reform, London: Hurst Company, pp. 2Î9-29; Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou,
pp. 25—^7; Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, New York:
Palgrave, 1999, pp. 48—60; International Crisis Group, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder:
Who are the Islamists?, Amman/Riyadh/Brussels: ICG, Middle East Report,
no. 31,21 September 2004.
" Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou, pp. 35-8.
20 Madawi al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia, Cambridge University Press,
2002, p. 175.
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(shura). In the words of King Fahd, 'I hope that efforts will be
confined to giving advice for the sake of God. If, however, someone
has things to say, then he can always come to those in charge and
speak to them in any region, in any place. As advice, this is wanted
and desired.'21 During the subsequent years the regime opted for a
combination of accommodation and repression, with the emphasis
on repression. For instance, the leaders of the Committee for De-
fence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), an Islamic human rights organi-
sation that had sprung up during the phase of mobilisation and
hoped to mobilise Western support for democratic reform in Saudi
Arabia, were forced to flee the country and establish themselves in
London in 1994, from where they launched their attacks on the
royal family. (Note that the word 'legitimate' in the English name for
the organisation is in fact used to represent the Arabic shar'i, strictly
meaning 'according to the shari'a').22 Those that remained had the
option of spending their lives in jail or cooperating with the autho-
rities. Two of the most forceful members of a new generation of
radical opposition shaikhs, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awda, called
the 'shaikhs of the Awakening' (shuyukh al-sahwa), who had signed
the Memorandum of Advice, chose the second option. They were
arrested in 1994 but later succumbed to pressure from the state and
toned down their radical rhetoric.23 As a result, by the second half
of the 1990s the non-violent opposition was either suppressed, exi-
led, incorporated, or allowed to voice their ideas as long as they re-
mained within the strict limits the state had laid down.
The repression and control of the non-violent opposition opened
the way for a violent phase of the cycle contention, which was laun-
ched by a bomb attack on an American building in Riyadh on
13 November 1995, killing five Americans and two Indians. In the
declarations of the three Salafi Jihadi organisations that claimed
responsibility for the attack the familiar threats and arguments of the
master frame of contention were repeated. One stated that unless the
'Crusader forces' leave Saudi Arabia, foreigners as well as Saudi for-
ces and members of the royal family would become 'legitimate tar-
gets'. They regarded the bomb attack as part of a jihad against both
21 Teitelbaum, Holier than Tfwu, p. 40.
22 Ibid.,p. 49-71; Fandy, The Politics of Dissent, pp. 115-47.
23 ICG, Saudi Arabia Backgrounder, p. 7.
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the rulers and the Americans. Three of the four men arrested for
their role in the bomb attack were 'Saudi Afghans', veterans of the
Afghan war against the Soviet Union.24 Their ideas coincided with
the non-violent opposition: the ruling family was kufr (infidel)
because it did not apply the shari'a and was aligned with non-
Muslim countries.25 The violent phase was underscored by an attack
on the American Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran on 25 June
1996, although the Shi'ite opposition seems to have been responsi-
ble for this attack.26 After 2000 violence in Saudi Arabia was for a
while characterised by a series of minor attacks on individual for-
eigners in which six persons were killed.
That it would take until after 9/11 for the violent phase of the
cycle of contention to reach a new height was due to the tactics of
the man who would become if not the actual at least the symbolic
leader of the terrorist phase of the struggle, Usama bin Ladin. Usama
bin Ladin shared many of the ideas of the 'shaikhs of the Awaken-
ing', establishing an oppositional organisation in London in 1994,
the Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC) ,27 Their arrest in
that year further deepened his dislike of the regime.2* Nevertheless,
his innovative tactical step was to focus first on defeating the 'greater'
or 'external enemy' (the United States) and then the 'lesser' or 'in-
ternal enemy' (the Saudi monarchy). His arrival in Afghanistan in
1996, where he was welcomed by the Taliban regime and could
benefit from the training camps that had been operative after the
defeat of the Soviets, allowed rum to wage this war first against the
external enemy.2'
However, even during this phase of waging jihad against the ex-
ternal enemy and the 'Crusader-Zionist' alliance, Usama bin Ladin
constantly castigated the Saudi regime. His first communiqué, issued
in Afghanistan on 23 August 1996, entitled 'A Declaration of War
Against the Americans Occupying the Land of Two Holy Places', was
characteristically also directed against the ruling Saudi family, which
34 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror, London: 1. B. Tauris, 2003,
p. 140.
23 Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou, p. 76.
26 Burke, Al-Qaeda, p. 140.




was accused of tyranny (zuitn), imposing unjust rule and deviating
from the true Islamic path. As the government had not implemented
the shari 'a, resistance against it was regarded as an individual duty
(fard 'ay«) on every Muslim: 'It is the duty of every tribe in the Arab
peninsula to fight the jihad and cleanse the land from these occu-
piers,'30 Foreshadowing the later terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia,
Usama bin Ladin in subsequent announcements called for 'fast-
moving light forces that work under complete secrecy' and will 'hit
the aggressor with an iron fist.' The youth of Saudi Arabia would
constitute the 'vanguard' of this movement that would martyr itself
for the cause.31
Whether it was Usama bin Ladin s decision to target Saudi Arabia
in May 2003, and refocus the jihad from the 'external enemy' to the
'internal enemy', remains unclear.32 However, given the virulent
verbal attacks on the regime voiced during the previous decade by
the non-violent Salati opposition and the way this was moulded into
its master frame of contention, it cannot have been a difficult step.
The real difficulty with this new tactic is that it encounters all the
problems that a social movement faces once it needs to build and
mobilise a following. Whereas Al-Qa'ida could suffice by playing on
the worldwide resentment against the last world power during its
transnational jihad against the United States, once the struggle be-
came localised, its branch, Al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula (QAP) ,
had to take into consideration a novel type of logistics necessary to
topple a regime. This is a much more complex operation.
Mobilisation and destabilising the state
The vicious war between QAP and the state that ravaged Saudi
Arabia from May 2003 should be regarded as part of the violent phase
within the larger cycle of contention that began in 1990.
31 «..pp. 147-8.
'2 Only on 17 December 2004, after the attack on the American Consulate in
Jeddah on 6 December, did Usama bin Ladin announce his support for the jihad
in Saudi Arabia. Although it is not certain that the voice on the audio tape is that
of Bin Ladin, most experts agree this is the case. The accusations against the
Saudi royal family were the usual: 'violating God's rules1 and alignment with the
'infidel' United States. Sources: CBC New, 1 9 December 2004 and Dar al-Hayal,
16 December 2004.
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In line with Tarrow's cycle of violent contention, both sides had
to do their utmost to win the struggle. It was a matter of life or death.
From its side, QAP had to destabilise the political system, gain access
to the authorities, split the elite, and succeed in mobilising and recruit-
ing a larger following of sympathisers and allies by maintaining the
credibility of the Salafi movement s master frame that held that its
opponents were unbelievers (kuffar). The US-led Coalition's inva-
sion of Iraq in March 2003 and the Saudi support must have convin-
ced QAP that the time to launch its campaign was ripe. Damaging
the vulnerable oil economy of the country by targeting foreigners or
its infrastructure would be one of QAP's most effective weapons to
bring down the regime." In its defence, the state had to appeal to the
rationality and trust of the population, demonstrate its efficacy by
destroying QAP as quickly as possible, and isolate and marginalise
the radicals from the moderates by demonstrating that they were un-
Islamic and therefore 'deviants from Islam', 'fanatics' and 'terrorists'.
Symbolically, the struggle between the two sides was represented by
the capacity of the authorities to arrest or kill the members of the
two lists of'terrorists' it published during the year 2003, whereas the
contenders had to remain at large. As in the larger cycle of conten-
tion, the violent sub-cycle consists of two phases: one of upswing
and potential mass mobilisation and severe shock to the state, and
one of downturn, of the phase of demobilisation and the crushing of
violent contention.
The clash began when on 18 March 2003 a bomb accidentally
exploded in an apartment in al-Jazira, a neighbourhood of Riyadh,
killing one of the members of what later appeared to be a cell of
QAP. During the following month the police were able to trace the
group to an apartment in another neighbourhood of Riyadh, Ishbi-
liya, where it found considerable stockpiles of weapons and explosives.
Although here and in other safe houses the militants had escaped by
the time the police arrived, the police found enough evidence to
identify the members of the 'Ishbiliya cell'. On 7 May the Minister
of Interior made the unprecedented step to publish the by now
famous list of nineteen names and photographs of the most wanted
-V1 Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obajd, Saudi Petroleum Security: Energy Infra-
structure Security Improving. Threats Loom from al-Qaeda, Shiite Population, Wash-
ington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004.
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'terrorists' for which a reward had been set (Appendix I).34 By taking
this step the state had for the first time declared war on the Salafi
Jihadi movement.
That its members were indeed dangerous, was underlined on May
12 when virtually simultaneous bomb explosions \vent off at three
different suburban compounds in Riyadh, one of them belonging to
the US military subcontractor Vmnell. The explosions killed thirty-
five people, among them seven Americans, in addition to sixteen
members of the suicide commando, ïn June a list of twelve of the
suicide bombers in the Riyadh 'operation' ('amatiyya) was published
(Appendix II).'5 The high number of'martyrs' in this operation and
its subsequent wide publicity in videos indicates that the bomb ex-
plosions were not just a means of targeting both the American and
Saudi enemy and undermining the economy and the legitimacy of
the state, but were also part of a repertoire of contention that is typi-
cal of Al-Qa'ida's cosmic struggle between the forces of good and evil.*
However, it is doubtful whether the action succeeded in attracting
wide support. The shock to the Saudi public concerning the high
level of violence would not be confined to the Riyadh bombing. With
growing concern, Saudis discovered that during the next months,
with two exceptions, none of the members of the Ishbiliya cell were
willing to allow themselves to be arrested. In most of the cases they
fought themselves to death, an action called 'indirect suicide' (intihar
ghayr mubashir) or 'the method of suicidal resistance' (ushtb al-tmtqa-
wama al-intihari) by one commentator." Although, for instance, Yusuf
al-Ayiri (no. 10), the leader of QAP at the time, was killed near the
town of Turba in the province of Ha'il \vhen he resisted his arrest on
31 May 2003 while his companion survived,38 the raid on the group
of Turki al-Dandani (no. 1) was more typical. Despite several attempts
34 Al-Sharq al-Au'saf, 6 May 2004. The following abbreviations will be used
hereafter: al-Sliarq al-Awsat—SA; al-Hayat—Hh;Jaridat al-Riyadh al-Yttutniyya—
JRY; hlamToday (website)—IT; a!-'Arabiyya website—A; Saw! al-Jihad—SJ;
hlamOnlme—IO; and sahat.fares.net—SF
35 In October another two of the Riyadh suicide bombers were identified when a
video of the testaments was released by their own group (SA, 17 November
2003). The identities of the last two remain unknown.
36 Burke, AI-Qaeda, pp. 26,37, 87.
37 SA, 5 and 10 July 2003.
38 SA, 4June and 30July 2003.
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by the security police to persuade him to hand himself over, he det-
onated a bomb on 3 July 2003 in a mosque in the town of Suwayr in
the province of Jawf, ending his own life and that of three of his
companions—among them Abd al-Rahman Jabara (no. 18).19 Simi-
lar violent clashes occurred in July at a date farm in the province of
Qasim, where two members of the List of 19 (no, 14 and no. 13) died.40
A month earlier, they had managed to escape from an apartment in
Mecca, Khalidiyya (hence, the 'Khalidiyya cell'), during which five
members died and twelve were arrested (Appendix IV).41
Finally, the violent, suicidal character of the movement was con-
firmed when :n September another member of the List of 19 (no. 16)
was killed together with two other members of his group, during a
shoot out with security forces in a building adjacent to the hospital
in the town of Jazan.4: Other violent confrontations took place
in November with a group that had taken refuge in a flat in the
neighbourhood of Shara'i' in Mecca, subsequently called the 'al-
Shara'i* cell' (Appendix Vlll)43 and in al-Suwaidi, a neighbourhood
in Riyadh.*4 As usual, in all these cases the quantity of weaponry and
explosives found by the police and subsequently put on display for
the press was impressive.
However, measuring the impact of the 'operations' and subse-
quent suicide actions should not be confined to their effect on the
general public: just as important is the effect of the violence on
'sympathisers'. These fall into three broad categories. First, the larger
list of 'wanted persons' (matlubin), who form the inner circle around
QAP, and whose names are only very rarely disclosed by the autho-
rities. They are part of its network, some of them in sleeper cells.
These matlubin must primarily be sought among the 5,000 to 15,000
'Arab-Afghans', mostly of Saudi nationality. A second group consists
of members of some of the NGOs supporting the jihad in Che-
chnya, Tajikistan, or before in Algeria and Bosnia. Together, these
first two groups make up the main sympathizers of QAP4S Between
M SA, 7-10July 2004.
40 SA, 29-30 July 2003 and 3-8 August 2003.
41 ƒ•£ 15 June 2003.
42 SA, 29-30 July 2003 and 25 September 2003.
« /T3 November 2003;S.4,10 November 2003.
44 IT,(> November 2003.
4B Speculation on the number of 'Saudi Afghans' differs from one author to another.
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the two, a division of labour exists. While the matlubin, who were less
conspicuous than the hardcore QAP members, organised safe hou-
ses, rented cars, provided other logistics such as opening bank ac-
counts, and formed a potential reservoir of fighters, the more distant
sympathisers followed closely the websites of QAP and spread its
ideas. The third group of potential supporters consists of the reform-
ists, the followers of the 'shaikhs of the Awakening', who dominated
the first, non-violent cycle of contention, and whose ideas hardly
differ from the Jihadi Salafi movement. That the sympathisers were
indeed active can be gleaned from the clashes with the security for-
ces. The months after the Riyadh bombing were marked by numer-
ous announcements about shoot-outs and arrests in Riyadh and the
provinces of Qasim, Sharqiyya and Jazan between security forces and
members of radical groups whose identity remained unclear, but
who probably belonged to the matlubin or the larger group of sym-
pathisers and potential supporters.* Nowhere, however, does the
opposition appear to have been coordinated or strong.
One of the reasons for the limited response of the sympathisers of
QAP was the success of the security poüce in hunting down the
members of the original group of the List of 19 and the matlubin
during the first months after the Riyadh bombing.47 By September
five of the List of 19 had died in the bomb attack on Riyadh, six had
died in shoot outs, and only six would survive the year 2003. The
remaining two (no. 2 and no. 12) would be taken into custody; one
of them, All al-Faq'asi al-Ghamidi, handed himself over through the
According to Champion there are 15,000 'Saudi Afghans1 (Champion, The Para-
doxical Ktnßdvm, p. 217); according to Teicelbaum around 5,000 (Teitelbaum,
Holier than Thou, p. 75). The difference can be solved. According to Gwen
Okruhhk 12,000 Saudi men went to Afghanistan, but actually only 5,000 were
trained and saw combat ('Understanding Political Dissent m Saudi Arabia',
Middle East Report Online, 24 October 2001, www.menp.org). The issue of
numbers is debatable for other reasons of interest. For instance. Burke makes a
distinction between: a 'hard core', a small group willing to die for Bin Ladin's
cause; the 'Saudi Afghans', which constitute the 'network of networks'; and
finally those who were not close to him but regarded him an inspirational force
and a 'godfather'. The first and second group partially overlap, as by definition
members of the 'hard core' are 'Afghan Arabs'. The third group would form a
broad movement (Burke, AI-Qaeda, pp. 127,155,194).
^JRY, 14 July 2003,8 December 2003,9 December 2003 and 21 May 2004.
47JRY.2 October 2003.
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mediation of the 'awakening shaikh', Safar al-Hawali—an indication
of how the non-violent and violent opposition were connected.48
This high rate of success convinced the Saudi security forces that
they had disabled the 'îshbiliya cell' (or the List of 19). Their opti-
mism was reflected in the appeals by family members of the activists
to hand themselves over to the authorities in the newspaper Jaridat
Riyadh ai- Yautniyya. The amnesty announced in October was inten-
ded to stimulate them to take this step."
Demobilisation and hunting down the terrorists
Official optimism vanished temporarily with the bomb explosion
on 8 November 2003 at the Muhaya residence compound in Riyadh.
In the blast eighteen people were killed while more than 122 people
were wounded, but only two suicide bombers died in the operation
(two survived and managed to escape). Yet, although the operation
jolted the authorities, it was not a success for QAP in terms of en-
hancing the organisations reputation. Its major flaw was that all the
victims were Arabs and most of them were Muslims. To underline its
determination to stamp out QAP, the Ministry of Interior reacted
swiftly by publishing on 6 December a new list of twenty-six of the
most wanted terrorists. This list was much more accurate and there-
fore more intimidating than the previous one—and therefore dis-
couraging to potential supporters—ranking those listed according to
their hierarchy within QAP. Six of the List of 26 had also appeared on
the List of 19; these appeared to be the oldest, the most experienced,
and by far the most dangerous: Khalid Hajj (no. 3/26), had become
leader of QAP after the death of Yusuf al-Ayiri (no. 10/19) in May
2003; Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin (no. 1 /26) would succeed Khalid Hajj
after his death in March 2004, while Salih al-Awfi (no. 5/26) would
succeed Abd ai-Aziz al-Muqrin when the latter was killed on 18 June
200450. Although by June 2004 the authorities would be successful
in hunting down most of the members of the List of 26, in the mean-
time tremendous damage was done to the reputation of the govern-
ment and its national credibility and international standing.51 The
** SA, 26-8 June 2003 and IT, 26-9 June 2003.
WSA. 2 October 2003.
50 This succession remains unclear: it later appeared that al-Muqrin had in fact des-
ignated Sa'ud al-Ulaibi as his successor.
51 According to Fans bin Hazzam, the Saudi journalist who provided most of the
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violent onslaught the regime was confronted with led some com-
mentators to believe its fate hung in the balance and that it might
succumb to internal divisions.52
The first success for the authorities came on 8 December when
the security police killed one of the members of the List of 26 (no. 6)
on the streets in al-Suwaidi in Riyadh; on 30 December another
member (no. 14) handed himself over to the authorities, and subse-
quently probably informed on his comrades. Some success also came
in the ideological battle. To the dismay of the radicals, in December
2003, during interviews with A'idh al-Qarni on Saudi state tele-
vision, the Jihadi S.il.iti shaikhs, Ali al-Khudair and his two col-
leagues, who had been arrested in June, recanted their own former
takßri ideas and the whole Jihadi Salafi master frame in public. In the
course of the following year the state would succeed in co-opting
and mobilising to its side many other former oppositional shaikhs,
including Muhsin al-Awja and Safar al-Hawali, thereby weakening
the force of the takßri oppositional frame of contention.
In hindsight the biggest logistical success was achieved on the
morning of 29 January 2004, when Khalid Hamud al-Farraj was
arrested. Although he was not on the List of 26 (but probably a mat-
lub, and in any case an Arab-Afghan), Khalid al-Farraj was close to
the core of the cell of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and Faisal al-Dakhil
(no. 11), the two most dangerous members of the List of 26. Their
hide-out was located in his house in al-Fayha', a neighbourhood of
Riyadh. When he and his father were led there by the police they
were attacked by his own group, who were probably informed by
Farraj's wife. Among the six killed was Khalid al-Farraj's father, who
was mistaken for a member of the security police. Called the 'treas-
ure chest of information' (khazinat al-ma'lumat), Khalid al-Farraj
seems subsequently to have cooperated with the police out of anger
of the killing of his father, representing a major breach in security of
the organisation. The incident is also interesting for the insight it
provides into the jihadi culture of the group Kahlid al-Farraj was
information on the lists for al-S!iartj al-Aivsat, the list of (remaining) 'matîubin' in
June 2004 was around a hundred names, most of whom were not involved in
operations, but provided facilities for those who were (al-'Arabiyyû websîte,
24June 2004).
52 Michael Scott Doran, 'The Saudi Paradox', Foreign Affairs, January/February
2004, http:www.foreignafFairs.org.
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part of. It appears that he was married to a sister of one of the two
matlubin who were killed by the police on Id al-Fitr (25 November
2003) in Riyadh. Moreover, the other three brothers of his wife had
died in the jihad outside Saudi Arabia, while Khalid al-Farraj himself
was a cousin of an important matlub.'3
Another success for the authorities was announced at the begin-
ning of February, when the police were informed that two members
of the group had died as a result of the wounds they had received
during the shoot out on 6 November in al-Suwaidi.'4 On 15 March
the security police were able to track down the leader of QAP, Kha-
lid Hajj, who was killed in Riyadh. At the end of April the police
surprised five members of the List of 26 in Jeddah, all of whom were
killed. It now seemed clear that the police was on the heels of the
mam leaders of the group of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin.
Yet the police proved unable to hunt down the rest of the QAP
members in rime to prevent further damage being done to its own
prestige and the national economy. On 12 April the security police
surrounded one of the main hide-outs in Riyadh of the group of
Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin which included Faisal al-Dakhil, Rakan al-
Sikhan (no. 2/26) and Nasir al-Rashid (no. 19/26). One of the
group, the matlub Khalid al-Subait, was able to hold off the police,
allowing his companions to escape" and kill four highway patrol-
men the next day during the escape to Buraida.56 These escapes—
besides discrediting the regime's claim to efficiency and providing
security, an important factor in upholding its legitimacy—formed
the background for a series of setbacks that would dominate the
attention of the Saudi and international public over the following
months. On 21 April 2004 Abd al-Aziz al-Madihish drove a car full
of explosives to the traffic police/security police building in Riyadh
in a suicide mission. The attack, claimed by the Battalions of the
Two Holy Places, one of the cells of QAP, killed six and wounded
144, leaving the security building in shambles (earlier the group had
5J Sec the following articles: SA, 30-1 January 2004 and 10-15 February 2004;and
SJ, 16, p. 10 and 23, p. 20. Much confusion surrounds the incident, but the full
story was revealed by Saudi journalist Fans bin Hazzajn in al-Sharq al-Awsat on
10 and 15 February 2004. He has subsequently been arrested.
H SA, 23 February 2004 and 7June 2004.
55 SA, 12 May 2004; HA, 3 July 2004.
56 SA, 14 April 2004 and 21 May 2004.
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tried to assassinate the third most important police authority in
Riyadh, Abd al-Aziz al-Huwairina).57
If this attack, for the first time directly targeting state institutions,
was an attempt to compensate for the backlash from the Muhaya
complex operation, subsequent attacks on foreigners resumed the
tactic of targeting one of the main sources of 'corruption' in society
and the economic props to the regime. On 30 April four men from
the al-Ansari clan went on a rampage for four hours through the
streets of the important oil town of Yanbu on the Red Sea coast
killing five foreign engineers and one Saudi and wounding another
twenty Saudis in the Swiss-Swedish company office of ABB.5e The
leader of the group, Mustafa Abd al-Qadir al-Ansari, had been an
internationally wanted mujahid.w Even more damaging for the
authorities was the attack on Khobar on 29 May. For more than 24
hours a group of terrorists was not only able to kill any foreigner it
found in its way and take a number of foreigners hostage (twenty-
two people were killed in all), three of its members, among them the
leader, Turki bin Fahid al-Mutairi, were able to escape and later tell
their full story in their bi-weekly, Saivt al-Jihad"' In the following
weeks the reputation of the Saudi government was further damaged
as several foreigners were killed in Riyadh, most notoriously the
beheading of the American military technician Paul Johnson. As a
result of these actions many expatriates who had their families in
Saudi Arabia announced that they would leave.
It was not until June 2004 that the authorities definitively turned
the tables on QAP and caught up with those responsible for the
assaults of the previous months. A crippling blow was dealt to the
Salafi Jihadi opposition when Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and Faisal al-
Dakhü were killed on 18 June." Turki bin Fahid al-Mutairi, die leader
of the so-called al-Quds Squadron (at-Sarriya a/-QwJi), who had led
the Khobar massacre three weeks earlier, was also killed. During the
next few weeks the police were able to mop up most of the rest of
the group during raids in the Malik Fahd and al-Wurud neighbour-
57 JO, 22 April 2004.
58 SA, l and 4 May 2004.
5' SA, 5 May 2004.
60 'Commander of the Khobar Terrorist Squad Tells Ehe Story of the Operation',
MEMRI Special Dispatches Series, no. 731, ! 5 June 2004.
"SA, 19 June 2004.
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hoods in Riyadh, killing a number of matlubin or others thought
responsible for some of the killings of foreigners, although Salih al-
Awfi, leaving his wife and children in the hands of the security forces,
escaped,K On 2 July the authorities announced that Rakan al-Sikhan
(no. 2) and Nasir al-Rashid (no. 19) had probably both died of their
wounds after the assault on the safe house in April.61 On 22 July Isa
Awshan (no. 15) was killed together with another member of his
group,M while on 5 August one of the most important of the 'theo-
reticians' of the List of 26, Paris al-Zahrani (no. 12), was arrested
while he was preparing a bomb attack on a cultural centre in the
town of Abha, in the south of the Kingdom.6*
Nevertheless, the last stretch of tracing the members of the List of
26 would prove difficult, even if it was clear that most QAP actions
were now desperate counter-attacks in retaliation for crippling gov-
ernment raids. Throughout the next half year, until April 2005,
when Salih al-Awfi was one of the two last members of the List of
26 at large, heavy fighting was regularly reported throughout the
whole country, but mostly in Jeddah, Riyadh and in the conservative
region of Qasim, one of the main bases of QAP, where it made its
last stand. In Jeddah, the base of Salih al-Awfi, three major clashes
took place in November and December 2004 and March 2005. In
retaliation, on 6 December the American consulate was attacked
during which all four fighters and a number of Saudi guards died,
but no American personnel was injured. In Riyadh several shoot-
outs occurred at the end of December 2004 in which Sultan bin Jad
al-Utaibi (no. 9) and Bandar al-Dakhil (no. 20) died, among several
'matlubin'. This clash was followed by a bomb attack on the Ministry
of Interior and an office of the Security Forces on 29 December. On
6 April 2005 Abd al-Rahman al-Yaziji (no. 25) was killed during a
raid of his house in the neighbourhood of Khalidiyya in Riyadh.66
Finally, heavy fighting occurred in the region of Qasim. The clash in
Buraida and Aniza on 3 November lasted eighteen hours, while that
clash in Ras, the third-largest town of Qasim, lasted sixty hours from
62 SA, 2 July 2004; H/!,3July 2004; SA, 18 March 2005.
53 SA, 3July 2004; SJ, 20,7July 2004.
" SA, 25 August 2004; SJ, 22.2004.
65 SA, 7 August 2004.
* At, 7 April 2005.
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April 3 to 5. During the latter, between an unprecedented large con-
centration of QAP members (twenty) and security forces, fifteen
members of the group died, among them one of the most sought
after international terrorists, the Moroccan Karrm al-Tuhami al-
Majati (no. 4) and the probable leader of QAP, and one of its ideo-
logues, Sa'ud al-Utaibi (no. 7),'7 Other members of the List of 26,
Abd al-Majid al-Muni' (no. 18), had died on 12 October in a secu-
rity raid,6* while the Moroccan Husayn al-Hasaki was arrested in
Belgium in July 2004.w In March 2005 al-Sharq al-Awsat announced
that the last leading ideologue of QAP, Abdullah al-Rashud (no. 24)
had probably been liquidated in June by Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin and
his assistant Faisal al-Dakhil because he had questioned the legitim-
acy of attacking Sauds targets under the leadership of al-Muqrin.
especially the attack on the Muhaya compound.7" These last clashes
made clear that besides the members of QAP on the List of 26, many
'mathibin' were also active in the fighting. Around fifty of them died
in the period between 18 June and the end of April 2005 alone.
Many of them were as prominent as those on the List of 26: one of
those killed on 28 December 2004, Ibrahim Ahmad al-Rimi, was a
Yemeni believed to have been one of the leaders of QAP." The state
announced on March 7 that it had 700 'matltibin' in detention.72
Although at the rime of writing QAP had not been completely
destroyed, it was clear that it had not succeeded in any of its goals: It
had not vitally damaged the economy, destabilised the regime, split
its elite or made inroads into its security forces; and it had proved
unable to mobilise its sympathisers or the following of the Sahwa
shaikhs, let alone the larger public. As Prince Turki al-Faisal,the for-
mer intelligence chief and present ambassador to Great Britain,
pointed out, the group did not succeed in expanding its following
and therefore the security forces could concentrate on eliminating
the members of the two lists one by one.73 Symbolically, this slow
but systematic elimination of QAP members from the List of 26,
67 SA, 7-10 April 2005.
68 SA, 13 and 14 Ctoober 2004.
69 SA, 27 October 2004.
70 SA, 15 March 2005.
71 M, 30 and 31 December 2004.
11 SA, 8 March 2005.
73 S/l, 9 September 2004.
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splashed over the front pages of the newspapers, was a dramatic
counter-propagandistic move by the state. Although QAP tried to
present its casualties, especially the death of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin,
as martyrs for the cause against the kuffar, the death cult of QAP did
not mobilise concrete support. Later attacks, like the one on the
American consulate on 6 December 2004, have not turned this sit-
uation around.74
Members and Structure of QAP
There were additional factors that undermined QAP's means of
breaking through its isolation and aligning itself with the larger social
movement of Salafi contention. These relate to the geographical
origins, age, career patterns, type and level of education of the mem-
bers of QAP. Their experience in the Jihadi Salafi movement, espe-
cially Afghanistan, and the organisational structure of QAP, are also
relevant.
The avaikble biographical information for the most important
individuals concerned—sixty-four in all—is analysed below. The
data include: the members of the List of 19 (Appendix I); the List of
the 16 suicide bombers (Appendix II) (only nine additional indi-
viduals: 14 who have been identified, minus five who are already
included in the List of 19); and the List of 26 (Appendix III) (six of
whom are already on the List of 19). In addition, the twelve mem-
bers of the 'Khalidiyya cell' are included, as well as four of the most
important individual leaders not included in the lists, but who
belonged to the matlubin (the information on the forty-eight per-
sons on the three official lists, plus the suicide bombers, is more
extensive than that for the others, and is represented more fully in
the appendixes).
Location and urbanisation
One of the strong points of QAP is the geographical, tribal, social
and locational diversity of its members. Of the members of the List
of 19, six originally came from the south, three from the Hijaz, three
from the east and two from Riyadh (the regional origin of five is
74 The Economist, 11-17 December 2004, p. 37.
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unknown). Although determining their residence before the 'opera-
tions' is difficult—as most of them moved around constantly—four
of them had hved in Riyadh prior to the May 2003 bomb attack
there.
The social background of the List of 19 is harder to trace. We only
know for certain that the fathers of nos 6, 7 and 9 were, respectively,
a dentist,75 a high police officer in the Ministry of Interior,7'' and a
high civil servant in the Ministry of Commerce in the province of
Sharqiyya.77 Information on the others is inconclusive. Remarkably
for the activist profession they chose, at least four were married, but
it is quite possible that the number is higher.
Of the additional nine identified individuals from the List of 16,
five had lived in Riyadh, one in Medina and one in Jazan. Very little is
known of their social background. The fathers of nos 3 and 8 were
low-ranking police officers.711 Four of the suicide bombers were married.
More is known about the members of the List of 26. We know for
sure that five of the group were born in Riyadh and that twelve lived
in Riyadh at the time of the bombings, nine of them in the neigh-
bourhood of al-Suwaidi alone, including the leader of QAP, Abd al-
Aziz al-Muqrin. It is this densely populated neighbourhood and
other sha'bi neighbourhoods in southern Riyadh (such as Khali-
diyya) with a strong conservative religious character, where a host of
militant preachers preach in local mosques, that is the hotbed of
Jihadi Salafi resistance in Saudi Arabia.7' This neighbourhood is pro-
bably also linked to the Imam Muhammad Sa'ud Islamic University,
where seven of the List of 26 studied. Other populous neighbour-
hoods in Mecca (Khalidiyja), Medina and Jedda (the Univeristy
district), and the region of Qasim with the towns of Buraida, Aniza
and Ras, were also centres for resistance, although quite a number ot
the List of 26 also come from the south.*0
75 SA, 28 May 2003.
76 SA, 17 November 2003.
77 SA, 8 December 2003.
79 SA, 17 November 2003.
7^ For more information on this social and urban environment of the militant
groups.see SA,9 December 2003 and 7June 2004; iho HA, 5 July 2004.See SA,
31 December 2004 for an overview of the different neighbourhoods in Riyadh
where attacks took place.
80 SX, 21 May 2004,10 November 2004,18 November 2004, 5 April 2005.
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Age
An important indicator of the nature of the movement and its more
sectarian character is the age of its members. The information on the
members of QAP confirms the trend that the average age of Al-
Qa'ida members and members of other radical movements had de-
clined in the 1980s and 1990s to become the 'y°ur)g urban poor'
who form the dynamite of the Islamist movement.1" The average
age of the List of 19 (for whom we have all the data) is 28; that of the
additional known nine on the List of 16 is 26; and the average age of
those 19 on the List of 26 for whom the information is available is
27. Yet the average age is deceptive as it is pushed up by older mem-
bers such as Uthman al-Umari (no. 21), an arms dealer who had been
caught up in the events, who was 35. Three of the List of 19 were
only 23 years old, and two of the List of 26 were 22 years old, while
one was 23 years old. With an average of 19 years, the members of the
'Khalidiyya cell' were even younger. Five out of the twelve arrested
were 17 and younger.
The leadership of both the Lists of 19 and 26 (plus the List of 16)
belonged to the oldest members. The first three leaders, Yusufal-Ayiri,
Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin, Khalid Hajj, were 30 years old, while the
fourth, Salih al-Awfi, was 38. Other potential leaders who died in
shoot-outs or the blast in Riyadh in May 2003, like Turki al-Dan-
dam (no. 1) and Khalid al-Jaham (no. 5), were 29 years old. For the
four other matlubin we have no precise age, but they must have been
around 30 and belonged to the same generation as they were well-
acquainted with the leaders and had the same biographical itinerary.
Education and careers
If the youthful character of the movement is not exceptional for Al-
Qa'ida and other violent Islamist networks and movements, the
Hî Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups: Methodological
Notes and Preliminary Findings' in Saad Eddtn Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Demo-
cracy: Twelve Critical Essays, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1996,
pp. 1-33; Saad Eddin Ibrahim, 'The Changing Face of Egypt's Islamic Activism'
in Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam and Democracy,pp. 69-79; Luis Martinez, La guerre civile en
Algérie, Pans; Karthala, Î 998; Séverine Labat, Les islamistes algériens. Entre les urnes
et le maquis, Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1995;Kepel, The Trail of Political Islam; Hafez,
Why Muslims Rebel; Burke, Al-Qaeda, pp. 71,155. Most of the information on
the age of members of the lists is obtained from al-Skartj al-Awsat, 13 November
2003 and al- 'Arabiyya (website), 22 July 2004.
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educational background of the Saudi Al-Qa'ida group is.82 While
one often finds that members of radical Islamist movements have a
background in technical and natural sciences or medicine,83 and
almost none of them are specialised in religious studies, in Saudi
Arabia it is quite the opposite. Only one member of the List of 19,
Turki al~Dandani (no. 1), attended the Faculty of Science. He had
intended to become a doctor, but had broken offhis studies to go to
Afghanistan. Hamad al-Shamari (no. 14/19), who worked for Aramco
for a while, probably had a technical background as well.84 Two of
the List of 19 (nos 13 and 2) had a religious higher education and
had studied at the Faculty of Shari'a of the Imam Muhammad bin
Sa'ud Islamic University in Riyadh. Of the List of 16, two (nos 5 and
7} had studied for some time at a university, although it is not known
in which field and where; three (nos 2,3 and 8) had graduated (they
are also on the List of 19).
The specialisation in religious studies is more pronounced with
the List of 26. Nine of the list studied at the Imam Muhammad bin
Sa'ud Islamic University. In fact, a distinction is made between 'in-
tellectuals', called 'shari'a theoreticians' (munazzarin short'iyyin) and
the rest, who are called 'foot soldiers' (muqatilin trtaydaniyyiri) ."5 In
contrast to the foot soldiers, the intellectuals also seemed to be more
integrated into society, although due to their alliance to their Salafi
ideas they did get into trouble with the authorities. At the peak of
the intellectual hierarchy in religious knowledge are the five grad-
uates who were also members of the shari'a committee of the organ-
isation: Abdullah al-Rashud (no. 24), followed by Paris al-Zahrani
(no. 12), Sultan al-Utaibi (no. 9), Isa al-Awshan (no. 15) and Abd al-
Majid al-Muni (no. 18). The role of these 'theoreticians' has been
82 Most of the information on the education of the members of the lists is obtamed
from al-Sharq al-Auaat, 17 November 2003, al- 'Aminyya (website), 22 July 2004,
andjaridat ûl-Riyadh al-Yautniyya, 8 December 2003, unless otherwise indicated.
The preponderance of ulama in the Saudi opposition, in contrast Co the usual
make-up of the Islamic movement has been noticed by Teitelbaum (Holier than
Thou, p. 3).
83 Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups'; Valerie Hoffman, 'Muslim Fun-
damentalists: Psychosociaî Profiles' in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby {eds),
Fundamentalisms Comprehended, University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 199—230.
84 SA, 8 December 2003.
85 HA, 5 July 2004.
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important for the rest of the members, for their stature in giving
religious opinions has provided legitimacy for the actions of the
movement. It is here that their organ Saut al-Jihad has played a cru-
cial role. Not only did it inform its sympathisers, but it also provided
them with information and held their own group together. Without
this QAP would have been much less successful in projecting their
ideas to a general public, although its message of jihad, both as a means
to an end and as a goal in itself, does not seem to have attracted a
substantial number of followers. One explanation for the difference
between the 'theoreticians' and the 'foot soldiers' is that QAP is a
coalition between Arab Afghans and a new generation of local radi-
cal Salafi 'intellectuals', although the two categories overlap.*6
On the whole, the Saudi movement also differs from other move-
ments in its level of education.87 While in most countries, the Islamist
movement is a typical student movement,88 this is not the case in
Saudi Arabia. Of those forty-eight members for whom detailed infor-
mation could be obtained, only nineteen attended university courses
for a certain period and only eleven actually obtained a degree. Re-
markably, none of the four leaders of the movement had finished
their secondary school, most of them having gone off to Afghanistan
during their teens. This does not of course mean they were 'illit-
erate'; yet it does indicate that many obtained much of their intel-
lectual baggage from informal religious and highly ideological and
narrow education on the spot, enhancing their isolation from society.
Yusuf al-Ayiri, for instance, serviced his own website and publica-
tion, al-Bitar, and had published several books, all of them available
on the internet.8' Nevertheless, a lack of formal education does seem
a common phenomenon. Aside from the four who had a higher
education, four of the List of 19 (nos 5,6,10 and 19) had only a pri-
** For an interesting analysis of QAP along these Unes, see SA,6 April 2005. Paris
al-Zahrani is also known under his pen-name Abu Jmd al-Azdi. Many of his
works are available on the niainjihadi Salafi website, www.tawhed.ws.
87 The low level of education of the Afghan-Arabs in the 1990s has been noticed
by Burke, Al-Qaeda,p. 155. My information largely corroborates his. This would
contrast with the largely middle-class background of the followers of the non-
violent Islamic opposition {Teitelbaum, Holier than Thau, pp. 3,7).
8* Ibrahim, 'Anatomy of Egypt's Militant Groups1; Martinez. La guerre civile en
Algérie; Labat, Les islamistes algériens. Entre les urnes et le maquis.
m See www.tawhed.ws.
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mary school certificate, four had only obtained a secondary degree
(nos 3, 4, 11 and 16) and two had acquired a degree as secondary
teachers (nos 9 and 17). The level of education of the five others is
unknown. The List of 16 suicide bombers (minus those on the List of
19) confirms the information of the List of 19. Three had not
finished secondary school (nos 10,11 and 14), two had left university
early (nos 5 and 7), and only one had graduated from university
(no. 3), although it is not known what field he was specialised in.
Unfortunately, we do not know what schooling the four others had.
The List of 26 is a bit of an exception. As mentioned, nine of its
members had attended university courses, five actually graduated.
Three of the List of 26 (nos 8,14 and 22) did not obtain a secondary
school degree, one of them (no. 22) leaving school early and joining
a radical group in Mecca after his brother was killed in Afghanistan
in 1998. Another member (no. 20) had only had a secondary school
education. For six members we do not know their educational back-
ground, but it is unlikely that it is high (except for the two Moroc-
cans), otherwise they would have been included with the intellectuals
who wrote in Sawt al-Jihad. Remarkable are the professional con-
nections with the security police. For instance, Ahmad Saqr al-Fadli
(no. 8), who did not finish his secondary education, attended tech-
nical training, after which he first joined the army and then the police.
Al-Salih Awfi (no. 4/19) also had connections with the security police.
Not surprisingly, the group had erratic careers. With the excep-
tion of the fourth leader, Sahh al-Awfi (no. 4/19), who had a long if
undistinguished career as a policeman and security officer, most of
the members of the List of 19 had become professional insurgents at
an early age, most of them breaking off their education and their
relations with their families or leaving their jobs to join the jihad.
The older members of the List of 16 had working experience, such
as Muhammad al-Shahri (no. 7), who had worked in a grocery shop.
Of the List of 26, Ahmad al-Fadli (no. 8) was a policeman in Mecca,
Paris al-Zahrani (no. 12) was a judge, Khalid al-Qurashi (no. 13) was
in the army, Isa Awshan (no. 15) was a judge/imam, as was Amir al-
Shahri (no. 23), while Abdullah al-Rashud (no. 24) was a teacher.
Several were still students, as was the case with Mansur Faqih (no. 14).
Some were unemployed, like Abd al-Majid al-Muni (no. 18). Most
had become professional terrorists.
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Afghanistan and the international jihad
Undoubtedly the most decisive common feature of these members
is their experience in Afghanistan and their connection with Al-
Qa'ida. While this is not unusual for radical Islamist movements,90
the fact that, for the QAP members, Afghanistan has remained
important even after 9/11, does stand out. In total at least half of the
forty-eight persons of the three lists researched had been to Afghan-
istan, many of them even having participated in the war of the
Taliban against the Americans. Some had also been to Bosnia (3),
Chechnya (4), Tajikistan (1), Somalia (1), Algeria (1) and Kashmir (2).
These figures are on the conservative side as we do not have the
relevant information on four members of the List of 19 and thirteen
of the List of 26, while there are only eight for whom we know for
certain that they did not go. It seems likely, therefore, that many more
than half of the forty-eight went to Afghanistan and to other jihadi
theatres of war.
The three original leaders had been there when they were ex-
tremely young and subsequently became professional mujahids. Abd
al-Aziz al-Muqrin, 'Abu Hajir', had gone to Afghanistan when he
was seventeen, subsequently going back and forth in the period
1990—4, being trained in the al-Wal camp. He took part in the battle
of Khost with other Arab-Afghans. Later he became a trainer him-
self and left Afghanistan to fight in Algeria, Bosnia and Somalia. On
returning to Saudi Arabia he was arrested and detained for two and
half years before going again to Afghanistan, During this period,just
before the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, he
met the younger generation of the List of 19. When he returned to
Saudi Arabia, he visited his family and disappeared again, training the
group in the hills around Mecca and Medina.1" Yusuf al-Ayiri had
the same experience. At an early age he went to Afghanistan, where
he was trained in 1992 in al-Faruq camp, later himself becoming a
trainer. He was for a while the personal guard of Bin Ladin after he
had left Afghanistan.''2 Khalid Hajj, Abu Hazim al-Sha'ir', had pro-
bably been to Afghanistan at a later date, and trained there. He too
w Barnett R. Rubin, 'Arab Islamists in Afghanistan1 m John L. Esposito (ed.),
Political hlam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,
1997,pp. 179-206; Kepcl, The Trail of Political Warn. pp. 136-58.
91 SA, 10 December 2003.
n SA, 4 June 2003 and 30 July 2003.
296 Roei Meijer
had been a personal guard of Bin Ladin, probably at a later date than
Yusuf al-Ayiri.'3
Of the independent individuals we know that Khalid al-Subayt.
who provided the safe house in Riyadh for Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin,
had a similar experience to that of the leaders. Like Abd al-Aziz al-
Muqrin, he had left for Afghanistan when he was seventeen years
old. After he was severely wounded in his foot, he returned to Saudi
Arabia for treatment, later joining the jihad in Tajikistan and Chechnya,
where he married a Chechnyan woman. When he was wounded
again and returned, unable to participate in the jihad, he set up a
NGO to support the war in the Caucasus.94 The leader of the Yanbu
operation, Mustafa Abd al-Qadir Abid al-Ansan, also had extensive
experience in international jihad. He fought in Bosnia and the
Ogaden, before staying in London for two and half years, where he
worked with the Sa'd al-Faqih of the Movement for Islamic Reform
in Arabia (MIRA), a split-off from CDRL. After leaving London in
1997, he travelled to Afghanistan—where he fought in 2001 in Tora
Bora—and Yemen where he was arrested and released before re-
turning to Saudi Arabia.95 The same applies to Turki al-Mutairi, the
leader of the Khobar operation, who went to Afghanistan a year
before 9/11 and was almost on one of the planes that flew into the
World Trade Center. Having missed his opportunity for martyrdom,
he was able to celebrate the event with Usama bin Ladin. Like the
others, he fought the Americans with the Taliban.96 The same ap-
plies to Khalid al-Farraj.*7
Remarkably, the younger members of the three Lists had had
their Afghan experience at the end of the 1990s and even right up
till the American battle against the Taliban. Among those on the List
of 19, Turki al-Dandani (no. 1) had gone to Afghanistan six months
before 9/11, where he visited al-Faruq camp, and participated in the
war against the Americans. Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faq'asi al-Gha-
midi (no. 2) had stayed five years in Afghanistan, before fighting side
by side with Usama bin Ladin in the caves of Tora Bora. This also
applies to Khalid al-Jaham (no. 3), who the Americans believe had
93 54,23 February 2003.
94 SA, Î2 May 2004; SJ, 16,2004.
95 SA, 5 May 2004.
96 SJ, 22,2004.
'7JRX22 September 2004.
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been assigned to lead Al-Qa*ida in Saudi-Arabia with Abd al-Aziz
al-Muqrin and Ali Hajj. Also Salih al-Awfi (no. 4) was in Afghan-
istan for the first time in 1993-4 and is believed to have met both
Bin Ladin and Mullah Omar before returning to Saudi Arabia with
Khahd al-Jahani after the Taliban had been defeated. The recent
connection with Afghanistan is confirmed by itineraries of the other
five members of the List of 19 (nos 8,9,13,14 and 15), all of whom
had fought with the Taliban regime against the Americans. Even
members as young as Hani Abd al-Karim al-Ghamidi (no. 7), who
was 23 years old, had been to Afghanistan.
The pattern is much the same with the other lists. Nine of the List
of 16 (five when the members of the List of 19 are subtracted) had
direct Afghan experience, while six of the suicide bombers had not
been to Afghanistan. The List of 26 is less conclusive. We know that
at least four members of the twenty not appearing on the List of 19
(nine if one counts all 26) did go to Afghanistan. For only six mem-
bers can we be certain that they did not; on ten we have no infor-
mation one way or the other, but there seems no reason to assume
that the pattern would have deviated much rrom the other lists.
Although most of the members of the lists were Saudis, this gives
the wrong impression of QAP. Given the transnational character of
the movement and the strong links with Afghanistan and Chechnya,
it is not surprising to find many other nationalities among the group.
Among the seven who were killed or arrested together with Turki
al-Dandani, one of the leaders of the List of 19, in May 2003, one
was Syrian and two were from Kuwait.™ Al-Faq'asi was married to a
Moroccan woman, Khalid al-Subayt to a woman from Chechnya.
The leadership of the lists was disproportionately represented by
non-Saudis, which even gave rise to some problems as it is thought
that some within Al-Qa'ida believed that foreign leadership in the
Arabian Peninsula would not be acceptable with the population.
The best example is Khalid Hajj, a Yemeni who was the de facto
leader for a while until he was kiUed on 15 March 2004, while Abd
al-Aziz al-Muqrin was presented as the real leader even at that time."
The suspicion that Yemenis were in fact running QAP was renewed
after the shoot outs in Riyadh on 28—9 December 2004, when the
98 SA, 7-lOJuly 2004.
99 5,4,23 February 2004.
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Yemeni Ibrahim Ahmad al-Rjmi was killed. According to some
insiders it was he instead of Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin who had suc-
ceeded Khalid Hajj after his death, because Usama bin Ladin trusted
the Yemenis more than the Saudis.""
Organisation and tactics
One of the most difficult aspects to unravel is the actual organisation
of QAP. Although it is quite possible that on the international level
Al-Qa'ida works like a 'loose network of networks',"" forming a
'loose coalition1,1"2 and must be considered 'less an organisation than
an ideology',103 evidence in the Saudi Arabian case forces one to
conclude that QAP was a structured and hierarchical organisation. It
had a permanent leadership, which, when one of its leaders was killed,
was replaced. In addition, there was a council of advisers with several
committees, for Islamic law, military affairs, propaganda and finance.
Under command of the military committee was the section of'op-
erations', which controlled the cells. Among these were probably the
'al-Quds Squadron', 'the Battalions of the Two Holy Places'. How
tight this organisation was, is not clear. For instance, the Yanbu 'op-
eration' was probably an independent initiative. But its secret, exclu-
sive form indicates that it was well-organised and maintained strict
discipline. QAP only began to crack and break into separate parts
after the List of 19 was published and the security forces began their
hunt. This is confirmed by the information that is available on re-
cruitment and discipline. Characteristically, members of a cell were
recruited when they were young, were held in complete isolation
from society and were forbidden to read newspapers.1"4
It is against the background of this constant crisis that the change
of tactics must be analysed. As part of a larger social movement
whose goal is to mobilise the population against a regime it regarded
100 SA, 31 December 2004.
"" Burke./K-Qaei/a.p. 16.
"'2 Rohan Gunaratna, Inside AI Qaeda: Global Netuvrk of Terror, New York: Berkley,
2002, p. 76.
103 Jason Burke, 'Think Again: A! Qaeda', Foreign Policy, May/June 2004, www.for-
eignpolicy.com
104 Interview with Khalid al-Farraj and Abd al-Rahman al-Rashud on Saudi Tele-
vision Channel 1 on 21 September 2004, published the next day mjaridat al-
Riyadh al-Yawmiyya.
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as un-Islamic, QAP tried constantly to adapt its tactics to public opin-
ion. It started out with the tactic of massive suicide attacks against
foreign residential compounds in the hope of mobilising public
opinion against foreigners just after the invasion of Iraq. The number
of casualties—including important figures (e.g. Khalid al-Jaham)—
however, must have been considerable. The second attack on the
Muhaya compound was a propaganda disaster, as the only casualties
were Muslims or other Arabs. Afterwards QAP tried to regain sym-
pathy by attacking government buildings in Riyadh for the first
time, in April 2004. But the explosion did not seriously affect the
government's infrastructure; by then QAP's resources and stockpiles
of weapons were quite probably being discovered so it was no longer
able to launch spectacular attacks. Therefore the attacks with auto-
matic weapons on foreigners in Yanbu and Khobar were probably
the result of weakness rather than strength. The death of al-Muqrin
and most of his consorts confirms this picture.
Conclusion: The Limits of
After two years of upheaval, QAP proved unable to break through its
isolation and take the cycle of contention with the state to a new
level. Although it did thoroughly jolt the ruling family and the
foreign community, as well as the countries aligned with Saudi
Arabia, it did not succeed in destabilising the regime or crippling its
economy, nor in mobilising the population. One of the main reasons
lies in the weakness of terrorism in general, as a tool. As Tarrow con-
cluded, terrorist violence will 'chill the blood of the bystanders, give
pause to prospective allies and cause many who joined the move-
ment in its enthusiastic early phase to defect.*1"" Once state repress-
ion swung into gear the risks became too high for others to join,
although martyrdom was adopted as part of the repertoire of con-
tendon of QAP. Violence and repression were able to prevent QAP
from finding allies among the groups that formed part of the larger
reformist cycle of contention that had emerged in the 1990s. Insofar
as they did find allies among the matlubin, and sympathisers, many of
these were arrested, killed or were intimidated enough to prevent
them from actively supporting QAP To make matters worse for
105 Tarrow, The Power in Movement (1994),p. 104.
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QAP, the regime regained some of its previous resources as the
economy boomed on the back of high oil prices. Indeed, the state
appeared to feel emboldened to retreat somewhat from its promises
on reform, and resort to its traditional politics of repression and co-
opting of the reformists.106
Besides the larger strategic weakness of violence when applied m
a specific country, which has been demonstrated in the case of Egypt
during the failed struggle of the Gama'at al-Islamiyya in the 1990s
and the GIA in Algeria, QAP suffered from a specific weakness,
which lay in the background of its members, and its organisation
isolated them further from the larger Salafi social reform movement.
It is true that the diversity of their location, social background and
tribal affiliation should be regarded as important potential assets, and
that their publication Saw! al-Jihad allowed them to retain contact
with their 'sympathisers' and even beyond with the curious public.
But the isolation they found themselves in once they had decided to
use violence against the state, was only further enhanced by the
youthful age of its members, their even earlier recruitment into the
movement, the low level of their education (religious or otherwise),
their early, often traumatic and decisive experience in Afghanistan
(no doubt partly responsible for the turn to violence), in addition to
the hierarchical and closed-cell structure of the movement.
106 The Economist, 12-19 December 2004; Faiza Saleh Ambah, 'Moves Toward
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APPENDIX IV
NAMES OF THE 'KHALIDIYYA CELL' IN
MECCA ASSAULTED ON 14 JUNE 2003
Those who died
1. Ibrahim Abdullah al-Famsa (Saudi)






1. Ahmad Abd al-Rahman Harun (Chaad]). 15 years.
2. Ahmad Khalid Muhammad »J-Hisan (Saudi). 17 years.
3. Musa'id Abd al-Rahman al-Kharisi (Saudi). 17 years.
4. Khaüd Ali Tahir Muhammad Ah (Chaadi). 17 years.
5. Amin Muhammad Abdullah Aï Uqqal? a3-Ghamidi (Saudi). 18 years.
6. Bashir Muhammad Harun (Chaadi). 18 years.
7. 'Isain Khilf Muhammad al-Ghamidi (Saudi). 19 years.
8. Muhammad Fathi Abd al-Ati al-Sayyid (Egyptian). 20 years.
9. Rashid AbduiJah Ra&hid al-KhirhJan (no nationality given). 21 years.
10. Amir Abd al-Hamid Sa'ud aJ-Sa'adi (Saudi?). 24 years.
11. Majid Ibrahim al-Mughaynim? (Saudi). 25 years.
12. Abi Dhar' 'Ibrahim' (nationality unknown). 25 years.
Average age of this group of twelve is nineteen years. (SA, 13 November 2003).
17 June, Ministry announces the names of twelve terrorists, and of the five killed in
al-Khalidiyya, seven of them were younger than eighteen years old, among them
three from Chad, one from Egypt and one from Mali.
Additional information from aJ-saha.fares.net/shahat/, documents begin March.
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APPENDIX V
GROUP OF AL-DANDANI AT AL-JAWF,
3 JULY 2003
Arrested
1. Muhammad Sulayman al-Sab'abi (Saudi)
2. Nasir Farhan al-Ruwaih? (Sauds)
3. Muhammad Badr Hazbar (Syrian)
Those who died
1. Turki Nasir Mish'al al-Dandani (Saudi)
2. Rajih Hasan al-bin Hasan al-Ajami (Kuwaiti)
3. Abd al-Rahman Jabara (Kuwaiti)
4. Umash? al~Siba'i (Saudi)
Source: fares.net (it is not totally clear whether the people were arrested there:
said that five had been arrested).
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APPENDIX V!
GROUP OF AHMAD AL-DAKHIL IN
QASIM, 28 JULY 2003
This group had fled from Mecca and were livmg in the Khalidiyya appartment. It
is the most multi-national group.
Those killed:
1 Ahmad bin Nasir Abdullah al-Dakhil {Saudi)
2. al-Farid al-Harbi (Saudi)
3. Sa' ud Amir Sulayman al-Qunhi (Saudi)
4. Muhammad Ghazi Salim a]-Warl (Saudi, but according to SA, 6 May 2004 he is
Chaadi.)
5. ha Kama] Yusuf Tahir/Khatir {Chaadi)
6. Isa Salm Ali Ahmad (Chaadi)
One member was arrested: Ah Ibrahim bin Abdullah khiif aî-Harbi
Source: fares.net and SA, 6 May 2004 and 21 May 2004.
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APPENDIX VII
GROUP OF SULTAN AL-QAHTANI AT
AL-JAZAN, 23 SEPTEMBER 2003
Two (unknown members} handed themselves over, three were killed
1. Sultan Jabran bin Muhammad A! Isman al-Qahtani
2. Turki bin Sa'id bin Muhammad Al Thiqfan? al-Qahtani
3. Khalid bin Muhammad bin All Al Isa al-Shahn
3 1 ( 1
APPENDIX VIII
LIST OF NAMES OF THE SHARAT
CELL IN MECCA, 3 NOVEMBER 2003
1. Muhammad al-Harqan. 25 years
2. Ta' 'Ayn 'Ayn. [letter abbreviation onJy identification] 25 years
3. Muhammad Sulayman al-Jaham. 25 years.
4. Hamid al-Sa'adi. 25 years
5 Mut'ab al-Muhyani. 26 years
6. Sami al-Lahibi al~Harbi. 27 years
7. S.Q. 27 years.
8. Muqayyim Tshadi. 33 years.
Of this group two were killed and two committed suicide, but just who is unknown
(SA, 13 November 2003).
311
